Pre-Emptive Self-Defence and Weapons of Mass Destruction : The scope of the UN Charter Article 51 in light of the current threat by Eriksen, Pål
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRE-EMPTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
 
 
 
The scope of the UN Charter Article 51  
in light of the current threat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kandidatnr: _____ 
Veileder: Professor Geir Ulfstein 
Leveringsfrist: 25. april 2003 
 
 
Til sammen 17205 ord 
 
 
 
14.05.2003 
 
 
 II 
List of Content 
 
1 PRESENTATION OF THE LEGAL ISSUE 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.2 THE CURRENT THREAT 2 
1.3 TERMINOLOGY 3 
1.4 THE LEGAL ISSUE 5 
2 PRE-EMPTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 8 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 8 
2.2 PRE-CHARTER LAW 8 
2.2.1 PRE-CHARTER CUSTOM (THE CAROLINE CASE) 9 
2.2.2 PRE-CHARTER TREATIES (ESPECIALLY THE PACT OF PARIS) 12 
2.3 THE TEXTUAL APPROACH 13 
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 13 
2.3.2 “NOTHING…SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT…” 14 
2.3.3 “…AN ARMED ATTACK…” 15 
2.3.4 “…OCCURS…” 18 
2.3.5 TEXTUAL CONCLUSION 20 
2.4 OBJECT AND PURPOSE 20 
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION 20 
2.4.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 51 21 
2.4.3 PART CONCLUSION 26 
2.5 SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 27 
2.5.1 WHY USE SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE AS A MEANS FOR INTERPRETATION? 27 
2.5.2 THE CUBAN QUARANTINE 29 
2.5.3 THE OSIRAK INCIDENT 32 
2.6 THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT THREAT 34 
2.6.1 INTRODUCTION 34 
2.6.2 INCREASED NECESSITY? 35 
2.6.3 RECENT STATE PRACTICE 40 
3 CONCLUSION 43 
 III 
4 LIST OF LITERATURE 44 
4.1 TREATIES/RESOLUTIONS 44 
4.2 JUDGMENTS/JUDICIARY OPINIONS 44 
4.3 OTHER DOCUMENTS 44 
4.4 BOOKS 45 
4.5 ARTICLES 47 
  1 
1 Presentation of the Legal Issue 
1.1 Introduction 
 
”…as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such 
emerging threats before they are fully emerged…History will judge harshly 
those who saw this coming danger but failed to act.”1 
 
This paper will examine whether armed force may be used in pre-emptive self-defence 
in order to combat the threat from weapons of mass destruction. I will have a general 
approach to the issue, but will use The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America (the US Security Strategy) from September 17th 2002 as a specific example. 
 
The right to self-defence in international law has long traditions.2 And it makes sense 
that States who are attacked should be allowed to defend themselves against aggressors; 
at least to some limit. The principle seems to be of an inborn kind because this right is 
also acknowledged within many domestic law systems.3 But even if the notion of self-
defence is generally accepted among international lawyers, the concept of pre-emptive 
self-defence is far more uncertain. 
 
Whether the path of military and violent action is the best way to achieve international 
peace may obviously be subject to disagreement. Mahatma Gandhi once said that “an 
eye for an eye makes the whole world blind” and history has sadly proved his statement 
right to an outsized degree. However, this paper is dedicated to the legal arguments 
surrounding self-defence in general, and the right of pre-emptive self-defence in 
particular. Rephrasing Gandhi, that is whether there is a legal right, in order to prevent 
losing your own vision, to take out your enemy’s eye before he/she takes out yours. 
                                                 
1 President George W. Bush jr. in his introduction to the National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America of September 17th 2002. 
2 Arend & Beck (1993) page 72, say it goes all the way back to Aristotle. 
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1.2 The Current Threat 
 
Weapons of mass destruction4 are indisputably of a horrifying and appalling character. 
Notwithstanding any categorisation, their common denominator is that they make it 
possible to cause grave and widespread injuries with just one single stroke. 
 
Nuclear weapons are perhaps deemed as the “worst of the worst”, and the International 
Court of Justice said the following when it gave its advisory opinion on the legality of 
those weapons: 
 
“…damage is vastly more powerful than the damage caused by other weapons, 
while the phenomenon of radiation is said to be peculiar to nuclear weapons. 
These characteristics render the nuclear weapon potentially catastrophic. The 
destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or 
time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem 
of the planet…it is imperative for the Court to take account of the unique 
characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, 
their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage 
to generations to come.”5 
 
The fear for these most devastating weapons is the background in which any anti-
weapons of mass destruction actions must be judged. The international community has 
taken different steps to avoid the proliferation of such weapons, for example the Treaty 
of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), July 1st 1968.6 Recently, 
disarmament (by different means) has turned into an attractive method to deter the peril 
of weapons of mass destruction, see e.g. the United Nations Security Council (UN 
Security Council) resolution 1441 (2002).  
                                                                                                                                               
3 E.g. the Norwegian Penal Code §§ 48 and 228 paragraph 3, and also Austrian law as cited by Neuhold 
(1977) pages 133 and 134. 
4 Detter de Lupis Frankopan (2000) page 234, refers to an United Nations General Assembly debate 
labelling weapons of mass destruction as “…atomic explosive weapons, radioactive weapons, lethal 
chemical and biological weapons, any weapons developed in the future with similar destructive effects to 
those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above”. Burroughs (1997) pages 19-20, has given 
a presentation of the dangers attached to the use of nuclear weapons. 
5 Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (Nuclear weapons opinion), paragraphs 35-36. 
6 And among many others; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972). 
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Weapons of mass destruction are not a new invention. Nevertheless, it is probably 
correct to see the current threat as something different than the threat from the same 
weapons during the Cold War.7 For a long time following World War II, two major 
blocs stood against each other, and thus to some extent controlled each others military 
power. This has changed after the fall of the Soviet Union as the threat no longer comes 
from another major power. Rather, possible attacks are predictably most likely to appear 
from so-called rogue States or international terrorist organizations. And it is feared that 
these sources of danger are more unpredictable, and hence more willing to employ 
weapons of mass destruction than what was the situation before.8 
 
Few are likely to challenge the serious down-sides of such instruments of grave peril 
coming in to the wrong hands, but the accuracy of these fears and the possibility for 
them to materialise, are nevertheless uncertain. Some claim that “[t]rends in terrorist 
activities make further incidents involving … WMD inevitable”, perhaps because “the 
motivations to use them are increasing, for a greater number of groups.”9 Nevertheless, 
it is called for not overdramatising the threat10 and it has also been claimed that the 
threat is less serious today than it was under the Cold War.11 
 
1.3 Terminology 
 
Self-defence; whether executed before or after a prior attack, may be carried out with 
different measures. From a common point of view, it seems plausible to interpret the 
term to include both military as well as less aggressive methods. States appears to have 
different views regarding what is embraced. Some States argue that economical and 
                                                 
7 Neuhold (1977) pages 240-258, gives a comprehensive report on the issue of pre-emptive self-defence 
in regard of the threat from the Cold War and weapons of mass destruction. 
8 This was stated by President Bush in a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio on October 7th 2002. The speech is 
published on www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html under the heading President 
Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat. He claimed that allowing certain States to possess these kinds of weapons 
may give them an opportunity to firstly blackmail their neighbours and thereby destabilising an entire 
region causing a threat to international peace. And secondly, that these States may give terrorist 
organisations possession of such weapon enabling them to cause severe injuries to USA and her friends. 
9 Gurr and Cole (2000) page 18. 
10 Ibid. chapter 10; it does not seem as if they believe such threats are likely to materialise in the nearest 
future. 
11 The Economist, March 8th 2003 page 13, 1st column (leader). 
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political pressure and measures should be included, in addition to the use of force. This 
was nevertheless not the successful view when the United Nations General Assembly 
(UN General Assembly) adopted resolution 3314 (XXIX) in 1974.12 Albeit only 
discussing the scope of “aggression”, this is relevant as use of force at least must 
contain aggression. Thus, if an act cannot satisfy the condition of “aggression” it can 
neither be categorised as “use of force”. The General Assembly emphasised the military 
aspects in their definition, and this paper will focus on the use of armed force in self-
defence.  
 
Self-defence may also be carried out aiming to achieve different objectives. Thus, it is 
named with different prefixes from time to time. Because States tend to employ any 
means necessary to justify their own actions, some of the following expressions may be 
used: Self-help, self-reservation, reprisals, anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence. 
 
Even though the mere wording may indicate a difference in opinion, a realistic approach 
to them in their context will lead to the conclusion that the core content for the authors 
of these expressions often is the same. Thus, I think it is insignificant to differ between 
e.g. pre-emptive and anticipatory self-defence. Most legal scholars use both terms in the 
same meaning as well, as does the US Security Strategy – the essence being that the act 
of self-defence comes ahead of an attack from another State.13 Some scholars do 
however seem to separate the two expressions in that pre-emptive self-defence is special 
because it deals with some future event and that the condition of immediacy, which is 
often required, is lacking.14 They accurately describes that some States now seem 
willing to apply the condition of imminence differently – and perhaps less carefully – 
than before. Nevertheless, this does in my opinion not affect the need for this 
requirement to be fulfilled. Thus, a partition in words appears to be artificial and 
unnecessary because the core content of both terms seems to be that the action comes 
ahead of an attack; in order to prevent it. 
 
                                                 
12 United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14th 1974: Resolution on the 
Definition of Aggression. The resolution was adopted without a vote. 
13 Gray (2000) pages 111-112: “…to use force even before their territory or units of armed forces are 
attacked…”. 
14 Breau (forthcoming) page 37, citing a former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. 
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As regards reprisals, the problem arises from different reasons. It will be pointed out 
more closely below that States seem to be a bit ambivalent when they are commenting 
events regarding the use of force in the context of self-defence – political relationships 
are probably more important in international law than what can be appreciated. This is 
not a problem unfamiliar to the issue of self-defence, or any other field of international 
law for that matter. What one State holds to be lawful self-defence, another State may 
look upon as a reprisal, and violation of international law.15 This is for example the case 
with the ongoing, and perhaps everlasting, conflict between Israel and Palestine in the 
Middle East. Military action from Israel is deemed to be unlawful reprisal by the 
Palestinians while the Israelis consider it to be legitimate self-defence. The illegality of 
armed reprisals is reported to have status as an international legal custom,16 possibly 
because of this statement in an UN General Assembly resolution in 1970: “States have a 
duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.”17 I will separate 
reprisals from being discussed in this paper but the vague limits may cause difficulties 
hereto.18 
 
In this paper “pre-emptive self-defence” will mean the use of armed force in advance of 
the development/use of weapons of mass destruction in order to prevent 
proliferation/conflicts. 
 
1.4 The Legal Issue 
 
The main rule in international law, with regard to the use of force, is set out as an 
important principle in the United Nations Charter (UN Charter)19 Article 2(4): 
 
                                                 
15 Reprisals as such are not unlawful. According to Ruud and Ulfstein (2002) page 183, it may be lawful 
if some specific conditions are fulfilled: To refrain from the use of armed force is one of those conditions. 
16 At least “[i]t cannot be expected that the Security Council will ever accept this justification.” This was 
claimed by Bowett in Reprisals involving recourse to armed force in 66 American Journal of 
International Law (1972), as cited by Harris (1998) page 915. 
17 General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), October 24th 1970: General Assembly Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 1970. 
18 This may imply that the cases I refer to as self-defence may be looked at as reprisals by others, and vice 
versa. 
19 Charter of the United Nations, June 26th 1945. 
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“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”20 
 
The International Court of Justice has referred to this prohibition against the use of 
force as a “cardinal principle” in international law21 and some legal scholars have even 
characterized it as jus cogens – a non-derogable rule.22 If this provision were exclusive 
as regards international law and the use of force, pre-emptive self-defence would be 
forbidden. However, international law accepts the use of armed force under some 
circumstances. 
 
This paper will not examine all possible exceptions; for example will the right to use 
force when it is authorised by the UN Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII 
in the UN Charter not be discussed. I will neither discuss regional arrangements in 
harmony with Chapter VIII of the Charter, but rather focus on the right to self-defence 
in the light of Article 51. However, no attention will be given to questions that in 
particular relates to the concept of collective self-defence. I will only refer to the right to 
use force – jus ad bellum – unilaterally. 
 
The current threat (section 1.2) has created a will among some States to seek to stop the 
proliferation and the circulation of weapons of mass destruction to a vast larger extent 
than earlier. Especially does USA seem increasingly eager to act to achieve her goals in 
this respect, as described in the US Security Strategy V. Taking into account the change 
of world order, she is apparently willing to act pre-emptive “to stop rogue states and 
their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction 
against the United States and [their] allies and friends.” USA adapts “the concept of 
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries” and believes 
that: 
                                                 
20 Generally on this provision Gray (2000), Harris (1998) pages 862-866 and Randelzhofer in The 
Charter of the United Nations – a commentary: volume I pages 112-136. The scope of Article 2(4) is 
apparently not in any way clear: Harris (1998) page 862: “The extent of the prohibition in Article 2(4) is 
not clear from the text” and Gray (2000) page 3: “…the rules of the Charter on the use of force are brief 
and cannot constitute a comprehensive code”. This may have impact on the interpretation of Article 51. 
21 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua-case) 
paragraph 190. 
22 Simma (1999) page 3. Generally on jus cogens; Harris (1998) pages 835-837. 
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“The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall 
or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively.”23 
 
When reading this together with the present campaign against Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein24 it is probable that USA (and perhaps some other States) is prepared to strike – 
with military force – in advance of any enemy in order to avoid the mere development, 
and most definitely in advance of any use of weapons of mass destruction. Although 
stating that this will only happen “if necessary”, they claim a right to act even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. These points of view 
are confirmed in the independent “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction” from December 2002, as set out under the heading of 
“Counterproliferation”. 
 
At the time of writing Iraq and Saddam Hussein are the biggest worries,25 but the US 
Security Strategy is formed in general terms and should therefore be judged to represent 
US policy in general. Other States can thus also fear possible action from USA in the 
future, if the Americans deem it necessary. 
 
This paper is therefore dedicated to examine whether unilateral and pre-emptive use of 
force in self-defence, in order to deter weapons of mass destruction from being 
developed/used, is lawful under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
 
                                                 
23 The US Security Strategy V. 
24 According to USA Today, February 21st 2003 approximately 130,000 soldiers were situated in the 
Middle East region, awaiting the arrival of about 25,000-30,000 more soldiers. These soldiers (and more) 
were March 20th engaged in military combat against Iraq (see more on this campaign in section 2.6.3). 
25 The Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, Jack Straw, is though reported to look at North Korea as the 
biggest threat over the next decade, Aftenposten, January 7th 2003 page 8. 
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2 Pre-Emptive Self-Defence and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Despite the prohibition against the use of force, there has always been commonly agreed 
upon the need for limitations from this starting point. The most well-known exception is 
probably the right to self-defence, now expressed in Article 51 of the UN Charter: 
 
”Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
 
The extent of this exception is nevertheless uncertain, and therefore subject to the 
present examination. The Article has been discussed in relation with many different 
legal issues, but I will solely focus on the one presented in section 1.4. In this regard, 
two rival “schools” of interpretation can be found; the restrictionist and the counter-
restrictionist.26 The supporters of the former is traditionally said to be traced back to 
Brownlie (1963), while the latter group finds inspiration in Bowett (1958). My 
presentation will deal with the different interpretation factors separately, and I pretend 
to deduce their legal implication as I go along. 
 
2.2 Pre-Charter Law 
 
Even if weapons of mass destruction were rare in the time prior to the adoption of the 
UN Charter,27 it might be useful to observe the position the law of self-defence 
                                                 
26 These terms are often used by legal writers when presenting the legal opinions of others, see Arend & 
Beck (1993) page 73. 
27 Nuclear weapons were for instance yet to be launched. 
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possessed at that time. Determining the state of affairs in 1945 may offer guidelines to 
both the textual approach, as well as the teleological one. I will look closer at the text of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter (section 2.3), and examine whether, and if so, to what 
extent the phrase “inherent right” might reflect the law as it was before the adoption of 
the Charter. Furthermore, pre-Charter law will be a significant part of the background 
and context from which the object and purpose behind Article 51 may most 
comprehensively be discussed (section 2.4). Thus, despite the lack of direct 
consideration of weapons of mass destruction, pre-Charter law may contribute to the 
general interpretation of the relevant provision; and therefore indirectly inflicting the 
present issue. 
 
2.2.1 Pre-Charter Custom (the Caroline case) 
 
Especially one episode in history looks to be very significant for the development of 
pre-Charter law, namely the Caroline case. It has also been subject to a substantial 
international legal debate.28 
 
“Caroline” was a boat abetting rebellions on the American-Canadian border, Canada 
being under British control at the time. The vessel, carrying men and arms to a position 
near the Canadian boarder, was set on fire and obliterated by the Britons who sent her 
down the Niagara Falls on December 29th 1837. But because the British action took 
place under an uprising, it may be argued that this is not an adequate example of pre-
emptive action, but merely an act in an on-going conflict. Thus, the relevance of this 
incident may be contested. This argument is for example vaguely presented by Harris 
(1998).29 I nevertheless see this incident to represent a good example for the present 
issue. Recalling the definition given of pre-emptivity in section 1.3, the main point is 
that the defensive action is taken prior to any enemy attack. And the general impression 
is that the destruction of Caroline is regarded as an anticipatory act, both among 
                                                 
28 Jennings (1938), and McCormack (1996) pages 242-248. As regards the facts I have heavily relied 
upon the former, who operates with notes to British governmental documents. 
29 Page 895 note 2: “…that the British Government was entitled to anticipate further attacks” (emphasis 
added). 
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scholars30 and judiciary tribunals.31 The communication between the Parties involved, 
does in my opinion support this approach: Great Britain claimed she had acted in “self-
defence and self-preservation”. USA apparently accepted Great Britain’s conduct (i.e. 
the destruction of Caroline), and thus pre-emptive self-defence if she could prove a: 
 
“…necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local 
authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized 
them to enter the territories of The United States at all, did nothing unreasonable 
or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be 
limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”32 
 
Great Britain accepted the US view as regards the legal conditions when “…[a]greeing, 
therefore, on the general principle and the possible exception to which it is liable…” 
leaving the problem between USA and Great Britain to be a matter of facts.33 
International law regarding the use of force then appeared to be limited in at least two 
ways. The use of force in self-defence was not to be lawful unless the “defender” could 
prove to have fulfilled the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as described in 
the letter from Mr. Webster. But if these conditions were fulfilled, international law 
seemed prepared to allow pre-emptive action. 
 
This incident has been regularly applied in the legal debate, but not all international 
lawyers uphold its relevance. I will now look at two reasons why this incident might not 
be used as a precedent for international law. Firstly, some might argue that no proper 
law can occur in the non-legal environment of the 19th century. It has been pointed out, 
with natural law losing its status, that the question was no longer whether a war was 
“just” or “unjust”, but rather whether war was lawful. Hall has been quoted to report 
                                                 
30 In his comprehensive presentation Jennings (1938) does not refer to any prior military activity, but 
merely refers to the circumstances as “rebellion”, pages 82-84. Bowett (1958) page 189, is more 
categorical naming the Caroline incident as “the classical illustration” of anticipatory action. 
31 Bowett (1958) page 160, quotes the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg: “It must be 
remembered that preventive action … is justified only” if the conditions from the Caroline case are 
fulfilled. 
32 Expressed in a letter from the American Secretary of State (Mr. Webster) to a British special Minister 
(Lord Ashburton), July 27th 1842, as cited by Jennings (1938) page 89. 
33 Expressed in a letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster of July 28th 1842, as quoted by McCormack 
(1996) page 247. 
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that international law at that time had to accept war,34 and if international law did not 
forbid war at the time, there would be no obstacles to accept the use of force in self-
defence either. In these circumstances it would be unreasonable to give the statements in 
the Caroline case too much significance. Despite this insecurity it seems obvious to me 
that the two representatives were discussing the legality of an act of self-defence. This 
appears from the already mentioned correspondence above, but particularly from a letter 
from Lord Ashburton’s predecessor (Mr. Fox) to Mr. Webster claiming that a British 
national accused for the murder of an American citizen in connection with the incident, 
had to be released because he had acted in self-defence for Her Majesty, even though 
not explicitly referring to “law”.35 Furthermore, the conditions applied in this case – 
necessity and proportionality – has been frequently referred to later, both in literature36 
and judiciary practice. The International Court of Justice did for example in the 
Nicaragua-case uphold these two conditions as essential in the assessment of the 
legality of self-defence.37  
 
Another reason to question the legal implication of this case is its lack of formality and 
its few participants. It might be argued that diplomatical correspondence between 
governmental representatives is inadequate to create legal principles, especially when 
representatives from only two States are involved. Additionally one must take into 
account that the letters were written almost five years after the incident, and thus under 
more peaceful circumstances. This obstruction is in my opinion a higher hindrance to 
overcome than the first one. Whether the statements of governmental representatives at 
all can be sufficient to develop international customary law alone is highly unsure. The 
prevailing view seems to accept a wide range of “state practice” as the basis for new 
custom, and statements from State officials are probably embraced.38 As regards the fact 
                                                 
34 Hall, quoted by McCormack (1996) page 243. The view was also supported by Brierly, International 
Law and Resort to Armed Force in 1932 Cambridge Law Journal, the latter referred to in Harris (1998) 
page 859. 
35 Expressed in a letter dated March 12th 1841, as cited by McCormack (1996) page 245. 
36 Constantinou (2000) page 25 stating that the content of the customary law prior to 1945 was “identified 
in the famous formula…in 1837 following the Caroline incident.” Also Arend & Beck (1993) page 72, 
claiming that “pre-Charter customary international law recognized a right of anticipatory self-defense 
provided the conditions of necessity and proportionality were met”. 
37 Paragraph 237: ”…even if the United States activities in question had been carried out in strict 
compliance with the canons of necessity and proportionality, they would not thereby become lawful. If 
however they were not, this may constitute an additional ground for wrongfulness.” 
38 Akehurst (1974-75) pages 1-11. His view is nonetheless contested by for example D’Amato, The 
Concept of Custom in International Law (1971), referred to by the former. 
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that only two States were involved, the law of today does not seem ready to accept the 
creation of an internationally binding custom on this basis alone.39 Nonetheless, taking 
into account the noticeably uniform acceptance this doctrine has achieved, I will argue 
that the limitations imposed on the law of self-defence became part of international 
custom throughout the 19th century. Whether the requirements still are applicable, and 
thus affecting the present issue, can only be examined in light of the legal development 
after the Caroline case. 
 
2.2.2 Pre-Charter Treaties (especially the Pact of Paris) 
 
Following the atrocities of World War I, State leaders were determined to create a treaty 
regimè in order to prevent similar events from occurring again. The first attempt was the 
Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919, followed by the Pact of Paris40 nine years 
later. I will only look into the latter.41 
 
The Parties to the Pact of Paris agreed in Article I to “condemn recourse to war”, and 
Article II encouraged the Parties to solve any conflicts between them “by pacific 
means”. The wording can hardly be described as clear or unambiguous, but can 
nevertheless be considered to oppose to the use of force in States’ international 
relations, albeit to an uncertain extent. The Pact of Paris did not mention the law of self-
defence at all, and this opens for two alternative interpretations. Either the treaty text 
was meant to be exclusive as regards the use of force. That is, that the Pact of Paris 
prohibited all use of force, including situations of self-defence and thus excluding the 
right to pre-emption. Or, the treaty text was intended to add something to the existing 
customary law. Recalling that there only were a few limitations on the legality of the 
use of force in pre-Charter time – besides the conditions set out in the Caroline case – 
Article I in the Pact of Paris may be read just to impose another constraint on State 
sovereignty in this regard, but still preserving pre-Charter custom as well. The omission 
                                                 
39 Akehurst (1974-75) pages 12-19. 
40 Treaty of renouncement of recourse to war, August 27th 1928, also known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact, 
named after the American and the French Foreign minister at the time. 
41 That Pact got the biggest number of ratifications, and its wording appears to be the more 
comprehensive one. McCormack (1996) page 249, says the Covenant of the League of Nations makes no 
express mention of the law of self-defence, but he nevertheless concludes that there is “no reason to speak 
of a restrictive right of self-defence.” 
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of a provision regulating the law of self-defence has been frequently debated among 
legal scholars, and the main impression seems to be that the latter proposition is the 
correct one.42 I find their reasoning to be convincing. Statements by the State leaders 
involved in the drafting of the Pact of Paris indicate that they did not intend to lay any 
constraints on the customary law of self-defence. Kellogg said that the right to self-
defence was “inherent in every sovereign state and [was] implicit in every treaty.”43 
And the British Foreign Secretary entirely agreed with Mr. Kellogg stating that the Pact 
of Paris “does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self-defence…”44 
 
If we are to trust the directly involved participants, there is no reason to claim that the 
Pact of Paris did abolish customary law as we knew it through the Caroline case. It is on 
this background I will examine Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
 
2.3 The Textual Approach 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention)45 Article 31 
paragraph 1 says that treaties are to be understood in accordance with the “ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms in their context”.46 Thus, when interpreting Article 51 
of the UN Charter one is supposed to find the common and usual understanding of the 
terms, and not any specific legal meaning.47 
 
A frequently contested part of Article 51 seems to be “[n]othing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of …self-defence if an armed attack occurs…” 
(emphasis added). These terms are used to argue both sides of the issue; both supporting 
and denying a right to pre-emptive self-defence. 
                                                 
42 Harris (1998) pages 861-862 and McCormack (1996) pages 248-253. 
43 Quoted by Bowett (1958) page 133. 
44 Quoted by Harris (1998) page 862. Bowett (1958) page 133, says that this was the opinion of Germany 
and Japan as well. 
45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23rd 1969. 
46 ”Context” is defined in Article 31 paragraph 2 to embrace among others the text, the preambles and 
annexes, and treaty-related agreements as well as treaty-related domestic instruments (accepted by the 
other Parties) made in connexion with the treaty conclusion. 
47 Harris (1998) pages 814 (note 3) and 816 (note 6). 
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2.3.2 “Nothing…shall impair the inherent right…” 
 
I will first look at the content of the Article that may be taken in account to allow pre-
emption. Recalling from section 2.2, pre-Charter customary law allowed pre-emptive 
self-defence if the conditions of necessity and proportionality were successfully met 
(the Caroline case). In this regard the phrase “inherent right” is of significant interest. 
As “inherent” indicates a retrospective approach, it may be argued that this phrase was 
implemented in order to preserve the law as it was at the time, and thus maintaining the 
legality of pre-emption. The fact that Article 51 is initiated with “[n]othing…shall 
impair” this right, supports this approach. It is thereby possible to suggest that the 
adoption of the UN Charter was nothing but a codification of current law.  
 
“Inherent” seems to reflect something old and perhaps even everlasting, thus being 
strongly in favour of a preservation of pre-Charter law. This point of view also seems to 
have profound support with regard to two other authentic translations, namely the 
French (“droit naturel”) and the Spanish (“derecho immanente”).48 The German 
translation is even clearer in this regard (“Naturrecht”), but it is not an official 
translation. The French and the German version may together be seen as if Article 51 
reflects natural law, and would, presuming that pre-emptive self-defence are to be 
deduced from such ideas, support those who claim that Article 51 preserves pre-Charter 
law, because it then would be seen to describe something self-explaining and constant. 
However, there are no indications that the drafters were conscious of any relation to 
natural law, so this is probably not a credible interpretation.49 Also, the English and 
Spanish wording does not appear to echo any connection with natural law. 
Nevertheless, “inherent” as a term focusing on the past will be seen to support the 
preservation of pre-Charter law and thus also a right to pre-emptive self-defence. This is 
not a view unfamiliar in the legal doctrine.50 
 
                                                 
48 UN Charter Article 111. 
49 Constantinou (2000) also sees this linkage to be unrealistic, see page 54, and furthermore vigorously 
contests the value the term “inherent” has been given, but this seems to be founded on other grounds than 
the mere wording itself, and should not be addressed in this section. 
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The Charter does not make specific mention of weapons of mass destruction but this is 
probably because these were rather unknown or at least not very wide-spread. The 
extent to how far the wording upholds pre-Charter law with regard to the issue in the 
present paper (section 1.4), might therefore be uncertain. But as the textual approach by 
nature is static, I see no reason to claim that the text itself looks differently at threats 
from weapons of mass destruction, than from any other threat. Thus, if the UN Charter 
preserves a right to pre-emptive self-defence in general, this right will also include 
deterrence of weapons of mass destruction (under the same conditions). 
 
2.3.3 “…an armed attack…” 
 
Opposing this view is the mentioning of “an armed attack”. It represents the textual 
basis of the restrictionist interpretation. The supporters of this school claim that this 
phrase requires an armed attack to have taken place before there is a right to use force in 
self-defence. If this view is to prevail, pre-emptive action, as defined in section 1.3, 
would be impossible to justify under Article 51. The above-mentioned statement from 
the US Security Strategy – that USA reserves herself the right to attack for defensive 
purposes “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack” – 
would then be inconsistent with international law.  
 
The term “an armed attack” is nevertheless not unambiguous itself, and may be the 
foundation for several reasonable interpretations. At least two problems seem to arise. 
Initially, it may be suggested that the mention of “armed attack” merely represents an 
example of a situation when self-defence can be lawful. This could imply that “an 
armed attack” is not absolutely necessary to accept the use of force in self-defence. 
However, this statement does not look too strong at the end of the day. The appearance 
of the term “armed attack” automatically gives the impression that this is an absolute 
condition which has to be fulfilled if self-defence is to be lawfully performed.51 And the 
identification of only one example could in that context create obscurities when only 
reading the text, and it would furthermore be superfluous to even mention it. The UN 
                                                                                                                                               
50 Bowett (1958) page 187, although he does not appreciate this as a necessary element to support the 
legality of pre-emptive self-defence. 
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Charter read as a whole also supports this; only allowing self-defence in case of an 
“armed attack” is best reconcilable with the prohibition against force in Article 2(4).52 
Thus, one may suggest that the Charter, read in full, argues that the use of force – even 
in self-defence – should be the last resort, and that the textual approach requires “an 
armed attack” to have taken place. 
 
The second question may prove to be more interesting. The scope of “armed attack” is 
vague and is therefore disputed among international jurists,53 and the scope will 
influence the legality of pre-emption under Article 51 – even if the threat is as brutal as 
the one from weapons of mass destruction. The uncertainty appears both alone in regard 
to the quantity, but also together with the term “occurs” in regard of the time. I will first 
examine which acts are capable to fulfil the scope. 
 
The treaty text is silent but does lead the mind to believe that some kind of cross-border, 
military intervention is required, i.e. that self-defence will not be lawful until the 
attacker has crossed the border, armed and with aggressive intentions. If that 
interpretation is correct, it would not embrace the development of weapons of mass 
destruction. Not even the launching of a missile from within a State’s own territory – 
whether with conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction – would then 
constitute an armed attack until the hostile missile crossed the enemy’s border. 
However, the French version of the UN Charter appears to take a more liberal approach 
because it sets out the condition to be “aggression armée”. This expression is alleged to 
be weaker and hence favouring a wider interpretation of “armed attack” than the 
English. That is, the French version does not require the same amount of activity as the 
English, and this may well effect the decision regarding the legality of pre-emption. 
This possible conflict between the two authentic versions of the UN Charter cannot be 
resolved by a textual analysis. The Vienna Convention Article 33 paragraph 1 decides 
                                                                                                                                               
51 This is supported by de Arechega, General Course in Public International Law, as quoted in Cases and 
Materials on International Law page 563. 
52 Bowett (1958) page 184: “The correct interpretation of Art. 51 is, in our submission, only to be 
achieved by a full appreciation of its relation to Art. 2(4).” 
53 Gray (2000) pages 96-105, claims that the scope of Article 51 is the real issue between international 
lawyers as regards the issue of pre-emptive self-defence. Bowett (1958) deals with this on pages 187-193, 
and Brownlie (1963) on pages 278-279. 
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that all versions of a treaty, as a starting point, are to be equally authoritative.54 The 
scope of “armed attack” must therefore be identified using other means.  
 
The International Court of Justice examined the term in the Nicaragua-case.55 It should 
be noted that Court did not deal with the notion of anticipatory/pre-emptive self-
defence.56 I nevertheless hold its examination of this expression to be relevant because 
the Court explicitly emphasised that it was the “nature” of the any possible acts of 
armed attack it was looking at. 
 
In paragraph 195, the Court stressed “action by regular armed forces across an 
international border” to be the major condition. It seems plausible to read the Court to 
include at least two elements. First, “action by regular armed forces” must be 
understood to be regular military activity, i.e. the use of armed force must be part of the 
expression. And secondly, the Court emphasised the international aspect (“across an 
international border”).57 This seems to require some sort of invasion, or at least some 
sort of territorial disrespect. This paragraph has been criticised for not going far 
enough,58 and it was also ground for dissenting opinions (from e.g. judges Schwebel 
and Jennings). It is in particular the reference to the UN General Assembly  
resolution 3314 (XXIX) that causes a dispute.59 Recalling that this resolution deals with 
“aggression”, one major indictment is obvious. There is a difference in the wording; 
aggression and armed attack are in their ordinary meaning not equivalents. The latter 
expression seems to embrace the former, thus demanding even more qualified armed 
actions. This is also recognised in the resolution itself.60 And even if aggression were 
                                                 
54 The provision reads: “When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is 
equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of 
divergence, a particular text shall prevail.” According to Harris (1998), there are some uncertainties as to 
how to resolve this kind of conflict. He refers to three different cases with three different outcomes, see 
pages 821-822. I will not take time nor space to examine this any further. 
55 It should be noted that the Court did not explicitly consider the scope under the UN Charter but rather 
under customary international law, due to an US reservation.  
56 Paragraph 194: “…the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has 
not been raised. Accordingly the Court expresses no view on that issue.” 
57 Additionally, the Court held that assistance to such acts, qualified to be armed attack: “…”the sending 
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of 
armed forces […] of such gravity as amount to” an actual attack conducted by regular forces.” 
58 Citations to legal scholars can be found in Gray (2000) page 97, note 42. 
59 The Court refers to Article 3 litra g of that resolution. 
60 The third operative paragraph says that States should refrain from aggression “and other uses of force” 
contrary to de lege lata. The fourth paragraph in the preamble of the Annex also favours this 
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held to mean the same as “use of force”, this does not necessarily constitute an “armed 
attack” in the meaning of Article 51 as the latter’s scope is more narrow. Nevertheless, I 
still recognise the definition, and perhaps particularly the discussion ahead of it, to be 
helpful to identify the minimum requirement of the term because it at least discloses 
what does not constitute an “armed attack”. A few States expressed a more liberal 
approach than others. They claimed it would be problematic for the definition that it 
only concerned “armed aggression”, and expressed that “economic aggression” also 
should have been embraced.61 However, the majority seemed to be satisfied with the 
scope of the definition. It was even held that it was important to limit the definition to 
“armed aggression” as a wider option could “provoke extensive interpretations of the 
right to self-defence”.62 The majority then seemed to take the view that even the more 
narrow expression “aggression” needs a military aspect to be fulfilled.  
 
The scope of the term “armed attack” then seems to at least involve some military 
action, and also some sort of cross-border activity, hence perhaps being closer to the 
English version rather than the French. This will in my opinion also be the result that is 
best reconcilable with the ordinary meaning of “armed attack”. Such a narrow scope of 
“armed attack” argues against allowing pre-emptive self-defence in general, and there is 
nothing in the wording to impose a different opinion because the threat is from weapons 
of mass destruction. 
 
2.3.4 “…occurs…” 
 
The last element of the wording in Article 51 that will be discussed is related to time. 
The text says that the right to self-defence is ignited when the “armed attack occurs” 
(emphasis added). The time aspect can be divided in at least two major issues. The 
relevant issue for this paper is when can an armed attack be recognized to have begun? 
This issue is closely related to the question of pre-emption. If an armed attack is deemed 
to begin by the mere military build-up, or here by the mere development of weapons of 
                                                                                                                                               
interpretation of the resolution because it emphasizes that the resolution should not affect the scope “of 
the provisions of the Charter”. 
61 1974 United Nations Yearbook page 841, 2nd column. The States included Argentina, China, India, the 
Libyan Arab Republic, Mali, Peru and Rwanda (also Gray (2000) page 96). 
62 Ibid. The Swedish representative is quoted like this. 
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mass destruction, then a right to pre-emption is embraced by the mere wording. But if 
the attack is not considered to have begun until the enemy is crossing the border, the 
legality of pre-emption may be seriously at risk.63 
 
The issue of time seems to be the genuine point of disagreement in practice. States in 
favour of an act will be likely to deem an armed attack to have occurred, while States 
opposing the act will be more reluctant. Thus, the factual analysis may cause severe 
problems. This is possibly because the wording is highly ambiguous. “[O]ccurs” in 
Article 51 is the present tense of the verb “to occur”, thus meaning something which is 
happening now. If we read “occurs” isolated from the rest of the provision it exposes no 
decisive information as to where an armed attack have to take place or how extensive it 
is required to be, before the right to self-defence commences. Thus, the mere 
development of weapons of mass destruction may alone be sufficient – this being an 
argument to allow pre-emption. This can be supported by suggestions in literature. It 
has been claimed that “[t]he moment of commencement of an armed attack essentially 
depends upon the means by which it is carried out.”64 And, unlike the gunfire from one 
single soldier, one battalion or an artillery unit, an attack with weapons of mass 
destruction can cause almost unlimited damage in just one single strike. Thus it may be 
possible to argue that the attack must be deemed to have commenced earlier, because no 
acts of self-defence could comprehensively combat these consequences of that kind of 
attack after it has taken place. 
 
However, the Vienna Convention Article 31 emphasises that the text must be read as a 
whole. In relation to “armed attack” the term “occurs” then seems to be significant in 
the opposite direction. To allow the use of force in self-defence then requires the armed 
attack to be happening now.  This view was also supported by the International Court of 
Justice in the Nicaragua-case when it stated that the right to self-defence is admitted to 
States “having been” the victim of an armed attack.65 This use of past tense strongly 
indicates that the restrictionist view should prevail. Recalling the most credible 
                                                 
63 The other aspect of time related to Article 51, is the question of the duration of the attack. For how long 
is a right to self-defence maintained? This issue obliges an armed attack to have commenced, and is 
therefore not relevant to this paper. 
64 Constantinou (2000) pages 125-127, examining different types of attack (but not the threat from 
weapons of mass destruction). 
65 Paragraph 195. 
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understanding of “armed attack” this means that the attack, after a mere textual 
approach, probably must include cross-border activity. Development of weapons of 
mass destruction would therefore not in itself be held to constitute an “armed attack”. 
 
2.3.5 Textual conclusion 
 
Despite the appearance of a conservative approach, as suggested by “inherent”, I hold 
the best way to understand Article 51, to make an argument against a right to pre-
emptive self-defence. In other words, the restrictionist approach seems to be the better 
one. The fact that Article 51 includes one, although vague and imprecise, condition to 
allow self-defence, supports this point of view, because it must be assumed to be 
implemented in order to reflect the intention of the Parties, which was held to be an 
important objective at the Conference.66 Nevertheless, the wording is ambiguous, and a 
further examination of Article 51 is welcome. 
 
2.4 Object and Purpose 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
Article 51 of the UN Charter must, according to Article 31 paragraph 1 in the Vienna 
Convention, be read “in the light of its object and purpose”. This is a comprehensive 
way to find the intentions of the Parties which was stressed as an important aim by the 
Parties.67 The relevance of these means of interpretation is generally acknowledged, but 
it will follow from this examination that the weight might be contested.68 
 
                                                 
66 This was expressed by e.g. the representative from Soviet Union, Mr. Talalaev, The Conference – 1st 
session page 175 paragraph 38: “The object of the interpretation was to establish the common intention of 
the parties, as expressed in the common purpose of the treaty”.  
67 The Conference – Summary Records page 40 paragraph 12. 
68 McNair (1961) chapters XXI and XXIII. 
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The separation of the interpretation factors – the text apart from its object and purpose – 
is not intended to reflect any difference in neither relevance nor weight, but is done 
merely to give a more systematical interpretation of Article 51.69 
 
Two central issues may arise from the aspect of “object and purpose”. The first is 
related to the object and purpose with the adoption and implementation of Article 51: 
Did the drafters intend to eliminate or amend pre-Charter law? And furthermore; can 
any circumstances in the world today support any particular understanding of  
Article 51? The first question will be examined in the following section, whilst the latter 
is subject for the discussion in section 2.6. 
 
2.4.2 The Implementation of Article 51 
 
If, as here, the text alone cannot help us identify the intentions of the Parties, other 
methods may be useful; including the Charter itself, its historical context, preparatory 
works as well as statements from the aftermath of the adoption. 
 
The application of those methods to identify the object and purpose with Article 51 is 
however not straightforward because they are cited as relevant, single factors as well. 
Especially may the application of preparatory works be complicated because it isolated, 
as opposed to the other factors, is regarded to be of only “supplementary” value.70 It 
was expressed at the Conference that the object and purpose did not enjoy the “authentic 
character as an element of interpretation”.71 However, this reflection only possesses 
limited value to the interpretation of Article 51, mainly because the Parties to the 
Vienna Convention were ready to recognise the submission of preparatory works as 
long as it did not create an “alternative, autonomous” understanding of the provision. 
                                                 
69 Interestingly, a similar view with regard to the internal hierarchy was expressed by the Expert 
Consultant, Sir Humphrey Waldock, at the Conference – 1st session page 184 paragraph 72. 
70 Vienna Convention Article 32 reads: “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or (b) leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” The US representative, Mr. McDougal, criticised this 
view, claiming that it did not reflect international practice, the Conference – 1st session page 167 
paragraph 43. This critique did however not make sufficient impact, and preparatory works got status as 
supplementary. 
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They went on to say that a “general link between two articles [Articles 31 and 32 which] 
maintains the unity of the process of interpretation” (emphasis added). They furthermore 
stated, on page 43 paragraph 19, that preparatory works would be relevant if it would 
“aid to an interpretation governed by the principles contained in Article [31].” And as 
the wording of Article 51 is unclear, I see no sufficient reason not to apply this factor as 
evidence for the “object and purpose”. Hence, I will therefore not separate them as 
regards the examination of the “object and purpose” of Article 51. 
 
The drafters did probably not have any threat from weapons of mass destruction in mind 
when drafting the UN Charter, thus their intentions can solely be seen to explain the 
object and purpose with Article 51 in general. 
 
The object and purpose of the drafters of the UN Charter can only be properly 
scrutinized if one understands the social and historical context of their time. The world 
had just deterred Hitler’s Nazi regimè, and USA was still fighting Japan. Nearly half a 
decade of world-wide-wars was coming to an end, but devastating and atrocious 
wounds from increasingly fierce warfare had left scars reminding the world of the 
hazard caused by the use of armed force. The desire to prohibit the use of force makes a 
strong argument against allowing any kind of force, including pre-emptive self-defence. 
World leaders had been trying to obtain treaty agreements to declare the use of force 
unlawful in between-war period as well, but neither the Covenant of the League of 
Nations nor the Pact of Paris proved sufficient to prevent World War II. The work 
however, continued – also during the second war.72 The will to unite in order to prevent 
forthcoming wars was strong,73 as reflected by this statement of the Parties to the Yalta 
Conference:  
 
“We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a 
general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe 
that this is essential both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, 
                                                                                                                                               
71 The Conference – Summary Records page 40 paragraph 10.  
72 Grewe and Khan in The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary: volume I pages 1-12. 
73 Murray in The United Nations Charter – a commentary and the text, page 10: “At the end of the 
European War the British Government, whichever party might be in power, was anxious to form an 
organisation for the maintenance of world Peace and Justice on the lines of a stronger League of 
Nations.” 
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economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing 
collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.”74 
 
The two wars and the understandable wish for a peaceful world were also recognised in 
preamble of the UN Charter.75 The preamble also stressed that armed force should not 
be used “save in the common interest”, and only to “unite” the world’s strength to 
maintain international peace. 
 
Both the historical context and the preamble can support the view that pre-emptive self-
defence, at the very least when executed unilaterally, were to be excluded from the 
international arena as from the implementation of the UN Charter. This seems to be true 
for at least two reasons. Initially, we must recall that it was finally agreed upon a 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations (Article 2(4)). This rule does as 
a starting point oppose any first use of force, and also forbids first-strikes performed in 
self-defence. One could therefore suggest that the system within the Charter itself 
opposed pre-emption. That is somewhat true, but cannot be decisive: Although one 
must take into account the interactivity between Articles 2(4) and 51, it is implausible to 
refuse any independent examination of the latter. As long as it has been laid explicitly 
down as an exception in the Charter, it deserves to be given consideration. But 
secondly, the Parties did also seem to intend to lay down co-operation as the best way 
to solve international differences. With pre-Charter law allowing unilateral pre-emptive 
action, this would conflict with such purposes and one may perhaps deduce that the 
Parties to the UN Charter therefore intended a very narrow understanding of Article 51. 
 
According to the preparatory works, the law of self-defence was not even included in 
the draft at all, but was implemented at the conference in San Francisco in 1945.76 It 
appears that the right to self-defence was codified only to reassure American nations 
that their collective security provisions from the Act of Chapultepec were not impaired. 
This may have different outcomes. Constantinou claims that this implies a heavy 
                                                 
74 USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union took part at that conference. The quotation is from the fourth 
section of the Yalta communiqué, cited in The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary: volume I, 
page 8. 
75 Paragraphs 1, 6 and 7. 
76 Miscellaneous No. 9 (1945) contains a comparison between the Dumbarton Oaks Draft and the UN 
Charter. 
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reliance on the prohibition in Article 2(4) and therefore strongly supports a narrow 
interpretation of Article 51.77 Thus, pre-Charter law would be changed in that the right 
to pre-emptive action was abolished, even under the Caroline conditions.  
 
However, the late implementation may also be read to support the conservation of pre-
Charter law, allowing pre-emption under the Caroline conditions. Any other solution 
would limit State sovereignty. And even if there is the right of sovereign States to create 
new and thus, change the current law at any time, it can be argued that they are unlikely 
to do so unless they have seriously discussed it in advance, which apparently was not 
the case. Especially, this can be a weighty argument when it is related to a concept with 
long traditions in international law. Self-defence is furthermore reported to be 
commonly respected in legal orders throughout the world, and this could be seen to 
reflect a wish to conserve already recognised law, thus also, a right to pre-emptive self-
defence. 
 
That conservation of pre-Charter law was to be the correct interpretation seemed to be 
the opinion of Great Britain. When presenting the UN Charter for the British Parliament 
in 1945, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden stated:  
 
“[a] most important addition is the recognition of the explicit right of self-
defence, both individual and collective, but in such manner that the final 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international 
peace and security is not impaired (Art. 51). It was considered at the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference that the right was inherent in the proposals and did not need 
explicit mention in the Charter.”78 
 
It appears that at least the British negotiators believed the UN Charter preserved the law 
of self-defence as it was before 1945. Eden’s presentation can however be challenged 
for at least two reasons. Firstly, the legal significance of such political statements can be 
doubtful. Allegedly, some may claim that a governmental presentation to its Parliament 
is defensive to some extent, hence over-emphasising the insignificance of the addition, 
                                                 
77 Constantinou (2000) page 26. Randelzhofer in The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary: 
volume I pages 792-794, considered this to be the “prevailing view” in this regard.  
78 Miscellaneous No. 9 (1945) paragraph 38 (emphasis added). 
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just to make sure to avoid critical comments from the political opposition. Nonetheless, 
I have no particular reason to claim that this was the case here, and will accept this 
statement to be the sincere perception of Minister Eden. Secondly, one can isolate 
certain parts of his statement and ask whether the confirmation of the UN Security 
Council as the “final authority” indicates that Article 51 shall be taken into account for 
the restrictionist view because this would deprive States the right to unilaterally employ 
military force. This would deny a right to pre-emption as allowed in the Caroline case, 
and could seem to be a natural consequence of such a procedural limitation of the right 
to use force. However, I do not hold the latter suggestion to be imperative as regards the 
interpretation either. Eden’s statement must be read in full, and I believe it is evident 
from the quotation that his major opinion is that Article 51 does not interfere with the 
already existing customary international law. 
 
The preservation of a customary law seems to be acknowledged within the International 
Court of Justice as well. In the Nicaragua-case it stated that the “inherent” right in 
Article 51 most likely was of a “customary nature”.79 The significance of this is 
nevertheless weakened by the continuance of the Court, stating that the UN Charter has 
“confirmed and influenced” the content, and that the Charter is not exclusive in this 
regard (“does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content”). The latter view 
was expressed in relation to the conditions of necessity and proportionality; “a rule well 
established in customary international law”. The Court then seemed to deem Article 51 
to somehow preserve pre-Charter law, but to an unknown extent. Nevertheless, the 
Court did at least accept the conditions appearing from the Caroline case, however, not 
performing any particular or thorough investigation of those.80 Furthermore, the view of 
the Court is not in any way connected to any threat from weapons of mass destruction, 
and that weakens the impact of the Nicaragua-case even more. And thus it left the 
present scope still somewhat uncertain. Furthermore it is suggested that the intentions 
behind Article 51 was to amend previous law, and that this has been affirmed by the ICJ 
in the Nicaragua-case, paragraph 193. I do not read paragraph 193 in the same way. I 
rather believe that the Court merely reaffirms that the law of self-defence is a part of 
                                                 
79 Paragraph 176 and also paragraph 193: “…the exception to the prohibition of force constituted by the 
right of […] self-defence as already a matter of customary international law.” 
80 The Court found USA to be violating the prohibition to use force, but did also briefly conclude that 
USA would not have met the conditions of necessity and proportionality either, paragraph 237. 
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customary international law, and that it does not at all deal with the impact of the UN 
Charter as such. 
 
2.4.3 Part Conclusion 
 
Both points of view can collect support from the object and purpose. I hold the counter-
restrictionist view to be the better one because it is unlikely that States would give up a 
major part of their sovereignty, the right to pre-emptive self-defence as accepted 
through pre-Charter law, without any specific discussion before the adoption of the UN 
Charter.81 States tend to be fairly protective with regard to their jurisdiction, and as long 
as the right to self-defence is traditionally seen to be essential for States, I mean that this 
is the legally responsible solution. 
 
This view is then contrary to the textual conclusion in section 2.3.5, and we are left to 
decide which view that should prevail. Article 31 in the Vienna Convention is not 
informative in that regard but seems to order a full and comprehensive consideration, 
and balancing process: Both factors are named in the same paragraph, with the heading 
of the Article being “[g]eneral rule” (as opposed to the “[g]eneral rules”). This view 
also has support from the Vienna Convention drafting Conference.82 Nevertheless, the 
majority at the Conference held the wording of a treaty to be the best instrument to 
identify the Parties’ intentions,83 and I will follow their instruction. This is also best 
reconcilable with the principle of State sovereignty which has a long tradition in 
international law and goes back at least some centuries.84 One significant consequence 
of this principle is that States as a general rule only can limit their jurisdiction 
                                                 
81 Grewe and Khan in The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary: volume I page 11, explain that 
the conference ran into time pressure at its final stages, thus this may have been the reason for not 
discussing this issue. 
82 The Conference – Summary Records page 39 paragraph 8: “All the various elements, as they were 
present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally 
relevant interpretation.” 
83 As far as I can see, only 4 States (Greece, Austria, Viet Nam and Trinidad and Tobago) expressly 
supported the US view; a teleological view preference. The majority expressed, here represented by the 
Soviet representative: “The text of the treaty was the main source of those intentions because it fixed in 
words the common intentions on which the parties had agreed” (the Conference – 1st session page 175 
paragraph 39). 
84 In Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, Schachter indicates that it arose in the early fifteenth century, 
pages 672-675. Cavallar (1999) chapter 5, asserts that Immanuel Kant also held the principle of 
sovereignty to be of major significance in international relations. 
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themselves – no one can take it away without the State’s consent. Such a limitation is 
most likely to take place when the State signs and ratifies a treaty.85 Pursuing this 
principle would imply heavy emphasis on the treaty text because this best represents the 
foreseeable amount of sovereignty given up.86 
 
But, recalling from section 2.3, the wording was not decisive as regards Article 51. And 
this opens for more emphasis on the object and purpose. The latter factor is also 
attached with a few concerns which could lessen its legal weight to the interpretation of 
Article 51. There is nothing which indicates that the drafters had any specific worry 
about neither pre-emption in general, or weapons of mass destruction in particular. 
Thus, it could be advocated that the object and purpose of the drafters should make little 
impact on the present issue. 
 
The interpretation of Article 51 is then still uncertain with regard to the specific issue 
raised in this paper. Hence, there is a need to apply other interpretation factors. 
 
2.5 Subsequent Practice 
2.5.1 Why Use Subsequent Practice as a Means for Interpretation? 
 
A possible way to understand a treaty provision is to examine States’ conduct. This is 
referred to as “subsequent practice” in the Vienna Convention Article 31 paragraph 3 
litra b.87 Such practice may have a side-effect as well. It may also be taken into account 
when examining whether a new custom in international law is developed. However, I 
will emphasise the impact of subsequent practice as a means for treaty interpretation. 
 
                                                 
85 Such points of view were also expressed in the France v. Turkey (1927), P.C.I.J. Reports, Series A, No. 
10 (the Lotus case), referred to by Harris (1998) at page 268: “The rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions…Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.” Additionally, States may obviously be bound by 
internationally accepted custom, see the Statute Article 38 number 1 litra b. 
86 However, State sovereignty has recently come under increasing pressure: Chopra and Weiss in 
International Law: Classic and contemporary readings page 376, stating: “The exclusivity and 
inviolabilty of state sovereignty are increasingly mocked by global independence.” I will not look further 
into the consequences of that. 
  28 
Using this factor as a technique to interpret treaties is well-recognised in international 
law. According to Fitzmaurice this is “desirable, as affording the best and most reliable 
evidence…as to what its correct interpretation is”.88 It is claimed that the application of 
subsequent practice in this respect is “both good sense and good law”.89 Furthermore 
the Conference held the applicability to be well established in international 
jurisprudence.90 
 
However, applying this factor in international law is not unproblematic. States’ conduct 
in international affairs is influenced by several factors, and the wish not to violate 
international law is one of them. Thus, there may be different approaches to justify any 
unilateral use of force. They may for example either leave legal arguments totally out of 
their plea, or they may try to justify their actions legally; but avoiding a clear and 
unambiguous language. This makes the identification of the States’ honest opinion as 
regards international law (opinio juris) greatly doubtful, and therefore weakens the 
weight of subsequent practice.91  The impact of this problem will be discussed in 
relation to the concrete examples given below. 
 
Legal debate has referred to a large number of incidents in this regard.92 I have chosen 
to examine only a couple of incidents in world history. The selection is grounded on a 
wish to achieve as much similarity in facts and argumentation to the specific issue 
raised in this paper as possible. In my opinion, this is essential to create a truly relevant 
factor of interpretation. I will therefore try to look exclusively at incidents containing 
elements of both pre-emptive self-defence and weapons of mass destruction, because 
the legal value of such incidents will be harder to challenge and contest. This excludes 
                                                                                                                                               
87 This provision reads: “There shall be taken into account, together with the context: any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation…” 
88 Harris (1998) page 815, quotes Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points (published in 28 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1951)). 
89 McNair (1961) page 424, and generally in chapter XXIV. 
90 The Conference – Summary Records page 41 paragraph 15. 
91 Gray (2000) also emphasises this, particularly chapter 1 under the heading Identification of the Law. 
This has especially been a problem with regard to self-defence because this is a recognised justification of 
the use of force, page 6: “It is clear that in the overwhelming majority of cases of inter-state use of force 
both states involved invoke self-defence against an armed attack by the other state.” 
92 The 1964 Harib Fort incident, the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Falklands 
War, the 1986 US bombing in Libya, the 1988 US bombing of an Iranian aircraft, the 1993 US bombing 
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most of the incidents usually referred to.93 The 1967 Six Day War does for example 
lack both my prerequisites. Israel did attack Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and did argue self-
defence as her justification. But she also argued that Egypt had taken action equivalent 
to an attack, and this contradicts the present definition of pre-emptivity (section 1.3). 
Furthermore, there was no explicit mention to any threat from weapons of mass 
destruction in that case. Also the 1986 US bombing in Libya fail to comply with my 
conditions, even though USA partly argued that the bombing also were meant to have a 
preventive effect. A more likely understanding may be to see the incident as a response 
to the killing of an American serviceman in a Berlin disco. This incident is also free 
from any linkage to weapons of mass destruction. 
 
2.5.2 The Cuban Quarantine94 
 
October 22nd 1962, USA initiated a naval quarantine against Cuba, using armed force to 
uphold it. The quarantine was addressed to the UN Security Council by all the involved 
parties, and was the topic of the 1022nd – 1025th UN Security Council meetings.95 The 
background for the quarantine was presented to the Council by the US representative. 
USA held her use of force to be necessary to halt the offensive, military build-up that 
was taking place on Cuba (with the help from Soviet-Union).96 USA alleged that the 
installations set up were capable of carrying thermo-nuclear warheads against both 
South and North America, thus creating a threat to international peace and security. 
USA further claimed her action was necessary because “a delay would have meant […] 
the nuclearization of Cuba, a risk which the hemisphere was not prepared to take”.97 It 
should be noted that USA also claimed regional security to be threatened, and that the 
Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution calling on their members 
to use all measures necessary, “including the use of force”, to prevent the receipt by 
                                                                                                                                               
of Baghdad, the 1998 US bombing in Sudan and Afghanistan and the long-term US and UK bombing in 
Iraqi no-fly-zones; to mention some of them. 
93 I do not claim my selection to be exclusive in this regard. 
94 1962 UN Yearbook pages 101-111, McDougal (1963) and McCormack (1996) pages 213-226 present 
general information regarding this incident. 
95 1962 UN Yearbook pages 104-107. 
96 Soviet-Union and Cuba denied this proposition; claiming the build-up to be necessary for defensive 
purposes, see 1962 UN Yearbook page 105, 1st column. Instead they requested the UN Security Council 
to condemn the American use of force. 
97 1962 UN Yearbook page 107, 2nd column. 
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Cuba of further military material. This does indeed weaken arguments arising from this 
incident, as it might rather be seen to be linked with Article 52 of the UN Charter. But, 
even if the expressed words may diverge from the doctrine examined in this paper, the 
concrete action taking place, was similar. I will therefore consider the US action as an 
example of pre-emptive self-defence aimed at deterring a threat from weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
The Council did not adopt any resolution condemning the US action, and this could 
perhaps be taken as an acceptance of the legality of pre-emptive self-defence. However, 
there are in my opinion several reasons not to deduce any such view from this incident.  
 
First of all, it is unthinkable that USA would vote in favour of condemning any action 
taken by herself. And, as she possesses a right to veto any material decisions,98 the lack 
of a resolution cannot be a weighty factor. Furthermore, the debate in the Council does 
not support the legality of the doctrine examined in this paper. 
 
The States who supported the US view, opposing a condemnation, did not make any 
legal references in their statements. Rather, they emphasised the factual aspects; their 
fear of the arrival of weapons of mass destruction to the region. Two of the members of 
the Council were also members of the OAS (Venezuela and Chile), thus it was not 
surprising that they expressed their support.99 The other side of the conflict, had some 
arguments linked with international law. Both Soviet Union and United Arab Republic 
stated that they held the quarantine to be “contrary to international law” and “aimed at 
violating the United Nations Charter”; but leaving any specific reference to the law of 
self-defence aside. It is therefore not certain that their legal view was based on self-
defence considerations. However, as long as their opposition argued that the quarantine 
was necessary to secure international peace and security, it is appropriate to assume that 
they made their judgment in that perspective. Opinio juris, if it can be deduced from 
these debates, then seems to be diverging. Furthermore it may be reasonable to ask 
whether such debates at all are legally relevant. The Vienna Convention Article 31 
                                                 
98 UN Charter Article 27(3). 
99 Additionally Great Britain, France, China (!) and Ireland stopped a resolution from being adopted. In 
addition some States (e.g. 12 African States) took a fairly impartial approach, rather seeking a peaceful 
solution based on diplomacy, see abstracts of their letter to the Secretary-General in 1962 UN Yearbook 
page 108, 1st column. 
  31 
paragraph 3 litra b states that it is the practice “which establishes the agreement of the 
parties” that should be recognised. This raises questions related to the amount and 
uniformity of subsequent practice, e.g. whether the practice of all parties is required. 
Maybe it is sufficient that a significant number of States practice in the same way, or 
possibly even that only the bigger and more powerful States behave similarly?100 These 
issues were not properly addressed at the Conference, thus it is difficult to give any 
certain answers. On one hand it was held that it was the practice of “the parties as a 
whole” that was needed. This supports the opinion that the practice must include all 
States; at least it suggests that States cannot expressly disagree. But on the other hand, 
the word “all” was withdrawn from the provision in order to avoid any 
misunderstandings as to the condition of quantity.101 The latter suggestion seems to 
acknowledge subsequent practice as a relevant factor even without the explicit support 
of all States, and perhaps even if some disagree. I hold this to be the most reasonable 
understanding. Then, it must be decided how many parties must agree (or not expressly 
disagree) in order to apply subsequent practice as a successful argument? An attractive 
assessment hereto would probably be that a significant majority is required. After all, it 
would not be tolerable to allow a few number of States to revise the treaty text 
themselves, especially when in contradiction to a large number of other States. This will 
also be in accordance with the view expressed by Akehurst.102  
 
But with only two States making legal arguments,103 and with the clear impact of 
political considerations (with classical Cold War impact), the value that can be drawn 
from this incident is strongly weakened. If any view concerning the present issue could 
at all be imposed, the incident would seem to support the restrictionist view. That view 
is also best reconcilable with the fact that USA chose to explain her action not merely 
from a self-defence point of view. If not even the State executing the use of force 
believes that her action is within the law of self-defence, it could rather be seen as a 
                                                 
100 The latter is suggested by Byers (2002), particularly page 32. 
101 The Conference – Summary Records page 42 paragraph 15. 
102 Akehurst (1974-75) page 18. It must be noted that he takes this position when examining the quantity 
of practice required developing new law through custom. That situation may request another amount of 
homogenity. After all, the creation of custom is different from treaty interpretation in that it takes place in 
“open space” while the interpretation of treaties begin with the examination of a written agreement 
between the parties. 
103 Ghana and Romania were the other States taking that part of the conflict. 
  32 
testimony of the illegality of a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. This has also 
received support in literature.104 
 
2.5.3 The Osirak Incident105 
 
June 7th 1981, Israeli aircrafts bombed and destroyed a nuclear research plant near 
Baghdad in Iraq (Osirak). It was not held that Iraq had failed to comply with their 
international obligations as regards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,106 and 
even more important Iraq had not attacked Israel in advance of this bombing. Iraq 
addressed the issue to the UN Security Council, claiming that Israel was guilty of 
unlawful use of force. The action taken by Israel is in accordance with the present 
definition of pre-emptivity (section 1.3), and the arguments put forward by Israel in the 
UN Security Council107 is also reconcilable with the issue raised in this paper; Israel 
claimed that Iraq used the Osirak reactor to produce atomic bombs with the intention to 
use such bombs against the State of Israel. The Israeli representative stated that “under 
no circumstances would Israel allow an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction 
against it.” Additionally, it was claimed that Israel merely had “performed an act of self-
preservation and exercised its inherent right of self-defence.” The facts and the 
argumentation seen together, makes a striking resemblance to e.g. the arguments given 
in the US Security Strategy V. However, the new world order, as described in  
section 1.2 may weaken the relevance and impact that could come from the Osirak-
incident. As seen above, the end of the Cold War may cause different approaches to 
legal issues. Nonetheless, this indictment does in my opinion have little impact on this 
particular event. Neither Israel nor Iraq was among the most significant Parties in the 
Cold War weapon mobilization – therefore the most identifiable observation that could 
weaken the relevance, is unsuccessful. Rather, the Osirak bombing should be regarded 
                                                 
104 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons (1969) page 345: Referring to the mention of regional arrangements 
“…instead of involving the right of self-defence under Article 51, are evidence of recognition of the 
dangers inherent in relying upon a claim to the right of self-defence going beyond the Charter text.” 
105 A thorough presentation of this incident is given by McCormack (1996). In addition to what is 
presented in 1981 UN Yearbook pages 275-283 (under the heading Situation between individual Arab 
States and Israel), I have relied upon his presentation of the facts at pages 15-110. 
106 UN Security Council resolution 487 (1981) paragraph 6 in the preamble, and also the UN General 
Assembly resolution 36/27 (1981) paragraph 6 in the preamble. 
107 The debate took place in the 2280th-2288th UN Security Council meetings, as referred to in 1981 UN 
Yearbook. 
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as very relevant to the present issue. This is because Israel’s statement implies that they 
saw Iraq as a “rogue State” (albeit not using such a modern expression) developing 
weapons of mass destruction with evil intentions. 
 
The UN Security Council discussed the case after receiving Iraq’s letter, and 
unanimously adopted resolution 487 (1981). After setting out the issue clearly and 
accurately in the preamble, the Council said in the first operational paragraph that it 
“[s]trongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation with the Charter”. 
On the outset it then seems as if the members of the Council did not tolerate Israel’s 
arguments under international law – described as a right to pre-emptive self-defence. 
This could prove to be imperative for the solution of the current issue. The legal 
significance of an UN Security Council resolution has though been contested. The 
Council is not a legal body, and thus the resolutions are held not to be legally 
decisive.108 It is true that most of the activity in the Council is under a political influence 
and of a political character, and that this is capable of weakening the legal weight of 
resolution 487 (1981). I nevertheless see this protest to be inconsequential because the 
resolution itself (“in clear violation with the Charter”) and the discussions in the UN 
Security Council ahead of its adoption, at the very least must be seen as evidence of 
opinio juris. This is maybe not equivalent to the main body of “subsequent practice”, 
but this is nevertheless suitable to illustrate the interpretation of the States.109 
 
Most members condemned the Israeli action as “a violation of the United Nations 
Charter and international law”110 as they did not accept the notion of self-defence, partly 
because it would set out a “dangerous precedent”.111 Spain, for instance, held that the 
Charter did not allow any right to preventive action by which a State could set itself up 
as a judge and policeman in respect of another country, whilst Japan said that the 
resolution only contained the minimum common elements voiced by the international 
                                                 
108 McCormack (1996) examines this in chapter one, and concludes that despite the unanimous 
condemnation, the legal weight of UN Security Council resolution 487 (1981) is serious but not 
“insurmountable”. 
109 Akehurst (1974-75), still discussing the creation of custom, examines “[w]hat constitutes state 
practice” at pages 1-11, and his broad approach will definitely include statements in UN Security Council 
debates. 
110 1981 UN Yearbook page 277. 
111 The representative of Uganda stated at page 276, 2nd column that the resolution “rejected Israel’s 
dangerous notion of the doctrine of self-defence. 
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community.112 Thus, the common accusation against State practice, namely their 
reluctance to make legal statements, does not appear to be valid in this case. In my 
opinion this a clear indication that pre-emptive self-defence was condemned in 
resolution 487.113 
 
But the reasoning is not entirely clear-cut. Some States also seemed to base their view 
merely, or at least jointly, on a factual basis. France and Great Britain expressed 
concern as regard to the law, but they did emphasise that it was Israel’s contention 
concerning Iraq’s intentions they disagreed with. France, who had sold equipment to 
Iraq for the build-up of Osirak, argued that their contracts with Iraq did not accept any 
military use of such installations. And Great Britain maintained that she did not believe 
Iraq was capable to develop nuclear bombs at the time. USA did not at any extent go 
into the law, but merely condemned Israel for failing to exhaust peaceful means. Such 
non-legal arguments might lessen the impact from resolution 487 because the resolution 
then can be said to be based on facts, rather than law.114  
 
In my opinion this denunciation cannot be given any particular emphasis, mainly 
because there was, at the end of the day, a significant majority arguing international law 
as their basis for the condemnation. And due to the similarity in facts and 
argumentation, I therefore hold the Osirak incident to strongly support a restrictive 
interpretation of Article 51. 
 
2.6 The Impact of the Current Threat 
 
2.6.1 Introduction 
 
The world has undergone major important changes, both politically and with reference 
to security issues, after the end of the Cold War. Recalling the brief presentation of the 
                                                 
112 The condemnation was repeated in the UN General Assembly resolution 36/27, see the 10th paragraph 
of the preamble and the 1st operational paragraph. 
113 Another possible consequence that might be drawn from State practice is the creation of new custom. 
But due to the conclusion I have reached in this section, it is unlikely that any customary law allowing 
pre-emptive action has been developed. 
114 This seems to be the basic foundation of McCormack’s view. 
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“new” current threat in section 1.2, I will examine the possible impact this may have on 
the interpretation of Article 51. It can in my opinion best be considered within an 
approach arising from the “object and purpose” (section 2.6.2) as well as from 
“subsequent practice” (section 2.6.3). 
 
2.6.2 Increased Necessity? 
 
The concept of “object and purpose” can be related to the size of the new threat. The 
nature of weapons of mass destruction is obviously of a grave character, and this is not 
contested by anyone today. One single, and in the eyes of an attacker successful, strike 
is sufficient to cause huge and devastating consequences to both individuals and States. 
And these consequences are a highly relevant source for concern. It can be suggested 
that these impending outcomes, ignites some sort of necessity sufficient to excuse the 
use of force.115 Because of the devastating consequences weapons of mass destruction 
may cause, the realistic question arising from the earlier mentioned Gandhi quotation, 
may be whether there is a right to blind another person, in order to prevent that person 
from killing you. The issue which really is at stake is how far a potential attacker should 
be protected by Article 51. Hence, the extreme potential risk of such weapons could 
favour a teleological approach, and thus the legality of pre-emption to deter weapons of 
mass destruction under Article 51. 
 
It may be proposed that the very interests and values Article 51 is set out to protect, will 
be ineffective if the provision cannot increase its scope. In the light of weapons of mass 
destruction, one may argue that self-defence sometimes must be executed in advance of 
the actual attack in order to have any effect at all.116 This strongly supports a right to 
pre-emptive self-defence under Article 51, because it would improve the defensive 
purposes. This view has to some extent found support among legal scholars. Applying 
the conditions set out in the Caroline case, it has therefore been claimed that self-
defence can be performed prior to any attack if this attack is imminent, i.e. a right to 
                                                 
115 Marcelo G. Kohen; The notion of ‘state survival’ in international law in International law, the 
International Court of Justice and nuclear weapons (pages 293-314) examines this in relation to the 
Nuclear Weapons opinion. He concludes that, although several scholars argue for this view, this notion 
has no legal value as such. 
  36 
pre-emptive self-defence.117 In addition to the severe potential damage from weapons of 
mass destruction itself, this may find support in the hesitancy of the international 
community to take the required action. 
 
The UN Charter system relies heavily on collective action118 as i.e. described by the 
limitation in Article 51; only allowing self-defence until “measures necessary” has been 
taken by the UN Security Council. However, such action is not necessarily adequate in 
situations necessitating self-defence. It has shown difficult to agree upon when it is 
necessary to act under Article 51 of the Charter, and then also how much action which 
then is required – especially in times of anxiety and international conflict. It is feared 
that too much diplomacy and talk can be fatal, and that the emphasis on collectivism 
should not prevail in this respect. Also, there has been suggested that there is a vital 
military advantage of striking first. 
 
The potential risk and the possible need to strike first in that respect can thus be held to 
favour the counter-restrictionst view in light of the object and purpose of Article 51. 
 
If that view is to be acknowledged as de lege lata, the next issue would be whether the 
current threat is sufficient to successfully meet the conditions of necessity and 
proportionality that are generally accepted to exist.119 The existence of these two 
conditions in international law was for example repeated in the Nicaragua-case.120 It is 
natural to believe that they agree that these conditions are relevant even if, or perhaps 
especially when, the threat is from weapons of mass destruction as well.  
 
These conditions, although separated in legal theory as well as in judiciary action, are 
strongly associated and may interact with each other in many aspects. If I were to 
distinguish between them, I would say that the major difference is related to the issue of 
                                                                                                                                               
116 Ruud (1980) page 75, points out a worst-case-scenario and says that the right to self-defence then can 
be constrained so much that is has no actual value. 
117 Ruud (1980) page 75, McCormack (1996) chapters 9.4 and 9.5, Ruud and Ulfstein (1998) page 169 
and Breau (forthcoming) pages 9-10,  
118 Paragraphs 6 and 7 in the preamble. 
119 McCormack (1996) chapters 9.4 and 9.5. 
120 Paragraph 176 said only “measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to 
respond to it” were permitted as regards the law of self-defence. The International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua-case also held the conditions of necessity and proportionality to be “well established in 
customary international law.” 
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time. The condition of necessity may be held to be most active prior to the act of self-
defence, whilst the conditions of proportionality refers to something that must be 
complied with in the aftermath of the beginning of the act of self-defence. But the 
distinction must not be over-emphasised. The latter indicates e.g. that the act of self-
defence cannot go further than what is necessary to achieve the aim with the self-
defence. If the defensive action goes any further than this, the defender would be in 
violation of international law herself. 
 
Because a prerequisite in this paper is that the enemy has not performed any attack (in 
accordance with the definition of pre-emption in section 1.3), it is probably more 
interesting to look closer at the condition of necessity in particular.121 
 
Although being traditionally accepted in international law, there is no definition as to 
when acts of pre-emptive self-defence are necessary.122 Legal scholars seem to adopt a 
narrow and strict view, only allowing such action if an attack from an enemy is 
imminent.123 In the Caroline case, the Americans and the British were only prepared to 
accept pre-emption if the threat was “instant” and “overwhelming”. According to Mr. 
Webster any other defensive act had to be “impracticable, or would have been 
unavailing”, thus leaving “no moment for deliberation”. This view only opens for a very 
narrow right to perform these kind of military operations, only allowing pre-emptive 
self-defence if there were no other options available. Thus, even if accepting a general 
doctrine of pre-emption, it is not certain that the use of armed force for defensive 
purposes would be lawful under the issue presented in this paper. 
 
Recalling from section 1.2, the potential risk with weapons of mass destruction in 
general is huge, and this might argue for a slightly less restrictive application of the 
condition.124 However, in my opinion this is not enough to make a conquering argument 
to accept the condition of necessity in relation to the present issue to be accomplished. 
                                                 
121 The issue of proportionality in this regard has been examined by Breau (forthcoming), who concludes 
that an attack to stop the development of weapons of mass destruction may be legal in that respect, whilst 
tracing anything beyond this (for example a regimè change) is a violation of international law. 
122 Gray (2000) page 107, says that the “questions of necessity and proportionality are dependent on the 
facts of the particular case”. 
123 Breau (forthcoming) page 10 and McCormack (1996) chapter 9.4.2, albeit the latter uses the term 
“proximity”. 
124 Bring (1997) page 181, cites Stone (Aggression and World Order, page 49) who argued this view.  
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The mere development of weapons of mass destruction cannot be said to represent an 
instant and overwhelming threat itself. To allow the use of force in self-defence under 
those circumstances would at least strongly contradict the mere wording because an 
“armed attack” could hardly be said to have commenced. 
 
However, the factor of object and purpose can also make a case opposing pre-emption, 
and I will now discuss some counter-arguments against such an interpretation of  
Article 51. Allowing that interpretation would undermine the significance of the United 
Nations in general, and the Security Council in particular. This opposes the object and 
purpose of the UN Charter system as a whole, emphasising the collective approach to 
maintain international peace and security to be the “primary responsibility” of the 
Council.125 
 
If a doctrine as the one proclaimed in the US Security Strategy V collects worldwide, or 
at least sufficient support, military force may well be more frequently used – claiming 
validity because of the law of self-defence. Thus any preventive function Article 2(4) 
may possess will disappear, and the major instrument to control the use of force in 
international relations will be then be released from the collective system of the United 
Nations and given into the hands of sovereign States. It will then be open for these 
States to determine whether the danger is imminent enough to authorise the use of 
armed force. Some States apparently believe that such a right only will be given to a 
few members of the world community, selected by them, but this is a misconception. 
The equality of States is in theory an untouchable element of world order,126 and all 
States will achieve the same right to decide that a threat is sufficient for them to use 
military force against an “aggressor”. Hence, the danger of abuse is grave. This could 
cause even increasing use of force and warfare, and may have as a result the opposite of 
the object and purpose of the UN Charter. It is unlikely that Article 51 could be read 
wide enough to open for this solution, even if the concrete purpose of self-defence as 
such, may seem to differ from this. The purpose of the UN Charter as a whole should 
prevail in this regard. That is, because the right to self-defence is an exception from the 
prohibition against the use of force, and the main rule should be considered the more 
important. 
                                                 
125 UN Charter Article 24(1). 
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If we suppose that no States actually abused this opportunity created by this doctrine, 
the consequences could still combat the true intentions of peace, laid down in the UN 
Charter. Suspicion and accusations of abuse would be likely to be borned from this 
doctrine, and this could constitute more aggressive and threatening situations.  
 
Furthermore it may be embraced in an argumentation against the right to pre-emption 
that the International Court of Justice did not exclude every use of nuclear arms in the 
Nuclear Weapons opinion, but rather kept a very narrow possibility open.127 Thus, the 
mere possession of such weapons cannot in itself be held to be dangerous enough to 
allow other States to attack the possessor. If so, many States would have the right to 
attack each other because there are many that hold these kinds of weapons. And as long 
as the mere possession of these weapons does not permit another State to use force, the 
mere acquisition of such weapons can neither be reason good enough to do it. 
Something additional is then required. This could be the fact that the potential aggressor 
is filled with cruel and bad intentions. Nevertheless, we will then need a “morality 
judge” to decide whose intentions are evil enough, and this takes us back to the danger 
of abuse. 
 
Finally, the value of any teleological approach based on today’s objectives may be 
contested. Such an approach may give international treaties a more dynamic emergence, 
which on one hand could prove to be practical. Multilateral and law-making treaties128 
are often subject to several hindrances during the drafting process. Much time, 
diplomatical efforts, money and international goodwill are involved to achieve 
agreement. Because the world is in a constant development some may suggest that a 
dynamic interpretation of treaties is appreciated to make it easier and less costly to 
amend former agreements. This approach were taken by some Parties at the Conference 
who were willing go as far as to support this if the result then were to “go beyond, or 
                                                                                                                                               
126 Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. 
127 The Court also referred in rather vague terms to the Article VI in the NPT, cited by Burroughs (1997) 
pages 2-3. 
128 “Multilateral and law-making treaties” meaning treaties with many Parties agreeing upon general 
principles or specific rules on broad fields of international law, as opposed to typical two-Parties 
business-contractual treaties. 
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even diverge from the original intentions of the parties as expressed in the text.”129 The 
latter was contested by a clear majority who highlighted the textual understanding as the 
supreme instrument. And there are strong counter-arguments opposing this approach. 
The use of treaties as an instrument to deal with international affairs directly affects and 
limits States’ sovereignty. To impose a dynamic interpretation of the treaty text may 
then seriously further reduce the sovereignty, and consequently it could be claimed that 
States should only be forced to comply with what they reasonably could foresee at the 
time of ratification. Many are therefore sceptical to allow this way of interpretation.130 
However, denying any right to dynamic interpretations may have a negative side-effect. 
In order to avoid re-negotiating all the time, States could be tempted to agree upon more 
ambiguous texts that could create even more uncertainty as regards international law. 
 
The consequences of allowing this doctrine could thus be equally as dangerous as 
denying it. Therefore, the object and purpose, if at all relevant, should in my opinion be 
taken into account for the restrictionist view, thus requiring an “armed attack” to have 
occurred – only accepting this condition to be fulfilled if some cross-border action is 
taken. Adding this with the conclusion of the textual approach as well as the one 
escaping from subsequent practice, I see this to support the restrictionist view. 
 
2.6.3 Recent State Practice 
 
In light of the current threat, as described in section 1.2, some States deem it necessary 
to expand their habits of self-defence. This is a view supported in the US Security 
Strategy V. USA claims that “new deadly challenges have emerged” after the Cold War 
to make today’s security environment “more complex and dangerous”. It is asserted that 
the legal order throughout the Cold War is no longer comprehensive to satisfy today’s 
adversaries. USA claims she is required to adapt “the concept of imminent threat to the 
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries”.131 The US Security Strategy may be 
seen to represent more recent State practice (“subsequent practice”). 
 
                                                 
129 The Conference – Summary Records page 38 paragraph 2. 
130 McNair (1961) chapter XXI and Constantinou (2000) are generally reluctant to accept any constraints 
on State sovereignty, whilst others (Byers (2002)) seem to have a more liberal view. 
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The present military campaign against Iraq may also be seen as an upshot of this 
strategy. The campaign and its reception in the international community may indicate 
whether the new, fundamental changes in circumstances have changed the legal climate. 
The use of force against Iraq, which started March 20th 2003, must nevertheless be seen 
through careful glasses. Despite the long-expressed fear of Saddam Hussein’s and Iraq’s 
desire for weapons of mass destruction,132 and despite the new policy of one of the 
military powers in the campaign,133 the action taken against Iraq is not directly 
applicable to the current issue. Nobody suggests that Iraq has executed any “armed 
attack”, as required by Article 51, but it is asserted that there are Security Council 
resolutions which authorises the use of force. This is for example suggested by the UK 
Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith,134 but most legal scholars deny this. This view was 
also denied by many States in the UN Security Council debate concerning the military 
action in Iraq.135 Thus, the relevance of any arguments taken from this action cannot be 
strong. In light of the US Security Strategy, and also because of the reactions of the 
international community to the bombing of Iraq, I nevertheless find sufficient reasons to 
add a few comments to it: 
 
Most factors indicate that opinio juris, even in the light of a threat from the feared 
regimè of Saddam Hussein, disapproves any doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence as an 
instrument to combat weapons of mass destruction. First of all, the fact that agreement 
could not be achieved in the UN Security Council can be held to support the 
restrictionist view. That is, because it could be seen to reflect that there is not sufficient 
opinio juris supporting the legality of pre-emptive actions. However, this would be to 
rush into conclusions. There could be several different reasons why the Council could 
not agree upon the use of force; for example it seemed apparent that many States 
claimed that peaceful means were not exhausted.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
131 The US Security Strategy V. 
132 The disarmament of Iraq has been demanded by several UN Security Council resolutions,  
e.g. 687 (1991) and 1441 (2002). 
133 The expressed US statement to use force even if “uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack”. 
134 See www.open.gov.uk/NewsRoom/NRArticle/0,1169,223412~801b22~fs~en,00.html; “Legal basis 
for the use of force against Iraq” also referring to resolution 678 (1990). 
135 Statements from the 4726th meeting are quoted in UN Security Council Press Releases 7705 and 7707. 
The meeting were open to all UN members. 
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But also comments after the outbreak of military action does indicate that it is, albeit 
among other factors, the legality of such a doctrine that is subject for condemnation. 
The majority of States expressing their view concerning this expressed that they 
regarded the US-led attack on Iraq as a violation of international law.136 However, no 
State representatives have discussed this in regard to the doctrine as such, and it is 
therefore not necessarily the legality in general which is opposed to, but rather this 
concrete application (e.g. the condition of necessity or proportionality is deemed not to 
be fulfilled). This obstruction can in my opinion not be especially weighty. The fact that 
they did not specify why they claimed the illegality of the action can never be seen to 
support legality of another doctrine than the one the attacker pleas. 
 
The fact that the coalition primarily tries to argue UN Security Council resolutions as 
their legal basis, may perhaps also be seen to question the legality of such a doctrine. It 
can probably be assumed that their reason for preferring that justification is evidence of 
a lack of necessary opinio juris.137 
 
Because of these significant uncertainties, I will not lay heavy emphasis on the 
argument drawn from the current campaign. But I find it reasonable to argue that the 
current actions at the very least does not support the legality of pre-emptive self-
defence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136 Among these States were among others Malaysia, Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Indonesia, Viet Nam, 
Sudan, Iran (the only country with concrete reference to the law of self-defence: “It was not waged 
against any armed attack”), Mauritius, China and Russia. Many States did not make any retrospective 
approach but were rather concerned with the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. According to reports 
and interviews on BBC World, March 20th 2003, Sweden and Germany also held the bombing to be in 
violation with international law and the UN Charter. 
137 This is probably not the case with regard to USA. Her representatives have made it clear that they 
believe pre-emptive self-defence is lawful, even without an UN Security Council resolution; the US 
Security Strategy V. 
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3 Conclusion 
 
I then deem most of the interpretation factors to oppose the legality of the examined 
question; the wording, subsequent practice as well as the purposes of the UN Charter 
strongly resist this to be part of international law. The only factor I hold to support pre-
emption, is a possible intention of the drafters to preserve the Caroline doctrine and not 
to change pre-Charter law (section 2.4.2). Nonetheless, there are good and sufficient 
reasons to lay more weight and emphasis on the other factors – especially the wording. 
And as long as the wording also has support in State practice, I find the conclusion to 
be: 
 
Pre-emptive self-defence in order to deter the development/use of weapons of mass 
destruction is not permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
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